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Article 5

Avian Flu: The Consumer Costs of

Preparing for Global Pandemic
By Joseph Nicosia III*

Introduction
The year 1918 is most commonly known for marking the end
of World War I, a brutal four years in world history that accounted
for the loss of over 10 million lives in combat.' While this number
serves as a tragic reminder of the costs of human conflict, it is modest
when compared to the estimated 20 to 40 million people that lost
their lives as a direct result of the 1918 Spanish Influenza. 2 Today
scientists find themselves fearful of another vicious strain
of flu
3
designated as H5N1, commonly known as the Avian Flu.
According to the United States Government's official web site
for information on pandemic flu and Avian Influenza, a pandemic is
defined as a global disease outbreak.4 A flu pandemic occurs when a
new influenza virus surfaces for which people have little or no
immunity and for which there is no known vaccine. 5 In the case of a
pandemic, the disease usually spreads easily from person to person
Joseph Nicosia III, J.D. candidate, May 2007, Loyola University
Chicago
School of Law; B.A. in Finance, summa cum laude, Boston College, 2004. The
author would like to extend his gratitude to family and friends for their unyielding
support and encouragement, as well as the faculty and students at Loyola
University Chicago.
1 Kristin Choo, The Avian Flu Time Bomb, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2005, at 36.
PandemicFlu.gov,

Pandemics

& Pandemics Threats Since 1900,
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/general/historicaloverview.htmi
[hereinafter
PandemicFlu.gov Historical Overview] (last visited Mar. 25, 2006).
PandemicFlu.gov is an official U.S. government web site managed by the U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services. Id.
2

3 Choo, supra note 1, at 36.
General
general/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2006).
4 PandemicFlu.gov,
5Id.

Information,

http://www.pandemicflu.gov/
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causing serious and often fatal illness. 6 Depending upon its ferocity, a
pandemic can sweep across the globe with remarkable swiftness
without regard to political, geographic, or cultural boundaries.7
While world governments may enact a variety of
countermeasures to combat the threat of a flu pandemic in attempts to
minimize its consequences, they cannot stop it from happening. Even
if the current Avian Influenza strain does not materialize into a global
pandemic, there is a strong likelihood that another deadly virus is
likely to emerge in the next decade. 8 The threat of such a pandemic
raises a laundry list of unanswered questions, including the
management and enforcement of quarantine zones, forced medical
treatment and vaccination, equal access to medicine, and the ability to
pursue causes of action relating to injuries sustained from medical
treatment and vaccination. 9 This article will not attempt to undertake
the Herculean task of examining the legality of all current and
proposed legislation on these issues. Instead, it will focus on the
impact that such legislation will exact on health care consumers in
the midst of a global pandemic and offer suggestions on how best to
mitigate these effects.

I.

Global Pandemics in the Modern Era

Since 1900 three actual pandemics and numerous pandemic
threats have occurred.' 0 The first and most catastrophic of these
pandemics was the 1918 Spanish Influenza, or "Spanish Flu"." The
Spanish Flu is the measuring stick against which all other modem
pandemics are assessed.' 2 It is estimated that the Spanish Flu infected
between twenty and forty percent of the global population and
claimed over 20 million lives, over 500,000 in the United States
alone. 13 The dramatic loss of life is attributed to the virus's high

6

id.

7 id.

8 Choo, supra note 1, at 41.
9 Id. at 38.
10 PandemicFlu.gov Historical Overview, supra note 2.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
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4 a trait that is shared with the
mortality rate among young adults,'
5
Influenza.'
modem strain of Avian
In February 1957, a second pandemic emerged after a strain
the Far East. 16
of influenza known as the Asian Flu was identified in
Sensing the possibility of a global outbreak similar to the one of
1918, the public health officials in the United States prepared by
increasing surveillance and initiating vaccine development.' 7 When
the virus struck the United States in the summer of 1957, it first
impacted school-aged children and pregnant women. 18 Although the
spread of the flu tapered off in December, a "second wave" rethe elderly. 19
emerged in early 1958, infecting large populations of
While advances in technology helped to alleviate the spread of the
Asian Flu, nearly 70,000 people still died in the United States alone.2 °
A third and final flu pandemic surfaced in 1968.21 The Hong
Kong Flu claimed the lives of 33,800 Americans, making it the
mildest of the three outbreaks. 22 Improved medical care and the peak
occurrence during the school holidays in December are cited as the
23
reasons for the lower number of fatalities.
Since the Hong Kong Flu, three pandemic threats have
emerged, including the recently discovered Avian Flu. In 1976, the
Swine Flu was identified in Fort Dix, New Jersey, but it never moved
beyond the immediate area of discovery. 24 In 1977, the Russian Flu
spread throughout the world.25 However, due to its concentration
primarily in school-aged children it is not regarded as a true

14 Id.

'5 PandemicFlu.gov,

Human Infection

with Avian

Influenza

http://www.pandemicflu.gov/general/#human (last visited Apr. 16, 2006).
16 PandemicFlu.gov Historical Overview, supra note 2.
17 Id.
18

Id.

19 Id.
20

Id.

21

PandemicFlu.gov Historical Overview, supra note 2.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id.

Viruses,
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26

In February 2003, another outbreak known as "Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome," or "SARS", was identified in Asia. 2 1 SARS
is a viral respiratory illness caused by a coronavirus, called SARSassociated coronavirus. 28 Over the first few months, the illness spread
to more than two dozen countries in North America, South America,
Europe, and Asia before it was finally contained.29 Currently, there is
no known SARS transmission anywhere in the world. 30 The most
recent human cases of SARS infection were reported in China in
April 2004 in an outbreak resulting from laboratory-acquired
infections.31

II.

Avian Flu

Avian Flu, also called the H5N1 virus, is an influenza A virus
subtype that occurs mainly in birds. 32 The virus is highly contagious
and often fatal among birds but does not usually infect people. 33 Most
human cases have resulted from direct or close contact with H5N1infected poultry or contaminated surfaces. 34 The total number of
human cases that have been reported globally since 2003 is 174,

26

PandemicFlu.gov Historical Overview, supra note 2.

27

Ctr. for Disease Control ("CDC"), Fact Sheet: Basic Information About

SARS, (May 3, 2005), http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/factsheet.htm.
28

Id.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31World Health Org. ("WHO"), China Confirms SARS Infection in Another
Previously Reported Case; Summary of Cases to Date - Update 5, (Apr. 30, 2004),
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2004_04_30/en/index.html.
32 Ctr. for Disease Control ("CDC"), Key Facts About Avian Influenza (Bird

Flu) and Avian
Influenza A (H5N 1) Virus,
(Feb.
7,
2006),
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/facts.htm.
"There are many different
subtypes of type A influenza viruses. These subtypes differ because of changes in
certain proteins on the surface of the influenza A virus. There are 16 known HA
subtypes and 9 known NA subtypes of influenza A viruses. Many different
combinations of HA and NA proteins are possible. Each combination represents a
different subtype. All known subtypes of influenza A viruses can be found in
birds." Id.
33 Id.
34 id.
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resulting in ninety-four confirmed deaths. 35 This startling fatality rate
of over fifty percent, compared to only a two percent fatality rate for
Spanish Flu, has been a major reason that medical experts
36 and
government legislators alike have expressed so much concern.
Predicting the likelihood that the Avian Flu will develop the
ability to easily travel from human to human is difficult. 37 However,
one striking characteristic of the virus is its ability for rapid mutation
in infected animals and humans. 38 While these mutations have
affected patterns of virus transmission and spread among domestic
and wild birds, they have not had any
39 discernible impact on the
humans.
among
transmission
of
modes
Since the Avian Flu does not commonly infect humans, there
is little or no immune protection against it in the human population.4 °
Common symptoms of Avian Flu in humans have ranged from
typical human influenza-like symptoms such as fever, cough, sore
throat, and muscle aches to eye infections, pneumonia, severe
respiratory diseases, and other severe complications.41 No
commercially available vaccine currently exists to protect humans
against the Avian virus strain that was identified in Asia and
Europe. 42 In 2005, research studies began testing a vaccine to combat
the virus and a series of clinical trials are currently under way.43
While some laboratory studies suggest that prescription medicines
approved in the United States for human influenza viruses could be
35

World Health Org. ("WHO"), Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human

Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1)

Reported to WHO, (Mar. 1, 2006),

http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian-influenza/country/cases-table_2006_03_01/e
n/index.html.
36 Choo, supra note 1,at 38.
37 WHO, Avian Influenza: Significance of Mutations in the H5N I Virus, (Feb.
20, 2006), http://www.who.int/csr/2006_02_20/en/index.html. Scientists do not
presently know which specific mutations are needed to make the H5N 1 virus easily

transmissible among humans. Id. Influenza viruses are inherently unstable. Id.
Specific mutations and evolution in influenza viruses cannot be predicted, making
it difficult if not impossible to know if or when a virus such as H5N I might acquire
the properties needed to spread easily among humans. Id.
38 Choo, supra note 1, at 38.
39
40

41
42

WHO, supra note 37.
CDC, Key Facts About Avian Influenza, supra note 32.
Id.
Id.

43 Id.
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effective in treating Avian Flu in humans, the viruses can become
resistant to these drugs. 4
Two antiviral medications commonly used for influenza,
Amantadine and Rimantadine, have already Sproven
• 45 to be ineffective
in treating human cases of Avian Flu in Asia. However, studies
suggest that two other antiviral medicines, Oseltamavir and
Zanamavir, would effectively treat influenza cases caused by the
Avian.46
A. Meeting The Avian Threat
The Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") has
identified an influenza pandemic as the greatest potential cause of a
rapid increase in death and illness of any natural health threat. 47 The
Center for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") has estimated
conservatively that up to 207,000 Americans would die, and up to
734,000 would be hospitalized, during the next pandemic.48
Estimates of the total direct costs pertaining to medical care and
indirect costs of lost productivity and death associated with such 49a
pandemic are estimated at between $71 billion and $166 billion.
These costs do not include
the economic effects of pandemic on
50
commerce and society.
Amidst the backdrop of this potential viral onslaught,
lawmakers have begun drafting new legislation to complement
existing pandemic preparation measures. At the federal level,
Congress is considering a bill known as Bioshield II, which is
intended to encourage private development of medical solutions. 5'
The goal of the bill is to entice pharmaceutical companies to invest in
vaccinations through patent extensions, tax breaks, and protection
from liability.52 Additional notable federal proposals include the
44

CDC, Key Facts About Avian Influenza, supra note 32.

45 id.
46 Id.

47

(2005).
48

Pandemic Preparedness and Response Act, S. 1821, 109th Cong. § 2(1)

Id. § 2(3).

49 Id.

50 Id.
51 Project Bioshield II Act of 2005, S. 975, 109th Cong. (2005).
52

Choo, supra note 1, at 39.
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Pandemic Preparedness and Response Act, Pandemic and Seasonal
Influenza Act of 2005, the Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine and
Drug Development Act of 2005, and the Influenza Preparedness and
Prevention Act of 2005. 53 The President has also amended Executive
Order 13295 to include reoccurring
forms of influenza as a
54
disease.
communicable
quarantinable
At the state level, the Model State Emergency Health Powers
Act ("MSEHPA") and the Turning Point Model State Public Health
Act ("Turning Point Act") have served as a reference point for
addressing a broad range of public health issues.55 The Turning Point
Act was drafted by the Center for Law & the Public's Health at
Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities ("Center for Law &
Public's Health") under the direction of the Turning Point National
Collaborative on Public Health Statute Modernization, a multidisciplinary group comprised of representatives from five states, nine
national organizations and government agencies, and experts in
specialty areas of public health. 6 It was designed to serve as a tool
for state, local, and tribal governments to use, revise, or update public
health statutes and administrative regulations.57 The MSEHPA was
also created by the Center for Law & Public's Health.58 It grants
public health powers to state and local public health authorities, "to
ensure a strong, effective, and timely planning, prevention, and
response mechanisms to public health emergencies while also

Pandemic Preparedness and Response Act, S. 1821 109th Cong. (2005);
Pandemic and Seasonal Influenza Act of 2005, H.R. 4603, 109th Cong. (2005);
Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine and Drug Development Act of 2005, S. 1873,
109th Cong. (2005); Influenza Preparedness and Prevention Act of 2005, H.R.
4245, 109th Cong. (2005).
54 Exec. Order No. 13,375, 70 Fed. Reg. 17,299 (Apr. 1, 2005) See infra Part
53

II.C for a discussion of the Executive Order.
55 MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (Ctr. for Law & the
Public's
Health
2001),
[hereinafter
MSEHPA],
available
at
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf; TURNING POINT MODEL

STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT

(Pub. Health Statute Modernization Nat'l Excellence

Collaborative 2003) [hereinafter TURNING POINT ACT], available at
http://www.hss.state.ak.us/dph/improving/turningpoint/PDFs/MSPHAweb.pdf.
56 Ctr. for Law & the Public's Health, The Turning Point Model State Public
Health Act, http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/Modellaws.htm#TP (last
visited Apr. 16, 2006).
57 Id.
58 Id.
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respecting individual rights." 59 While a number of states have
incorporated all or part of 60these Acts into law, there is still little
uniformity among the states.
While each of these pieces of legislation offers a unique
approach to preparing for a potential Avian Flu outbreak, each
significantly affects the rights of health care consumers in the event
of global pandemic. Four issues, in particular, are the subject of much
debate and conjecture as lawmakers race to determine the best course
for pandemic preparation: (1) the ability of government bodies to
implement mandatory treatment, including forced vaccinations, (2)
quarantine of individuals coming into contact with a contagious
disease, (3) equal availability to drugs and vaccines for the lower
socioeconomic classes, and (4) the legal remedies available for
injuries sustained due to vaccination. The remainder of this paper will
focus on how the aforementioned legislation pertains to each of these
issues.
B. Mandatory Medical Treatment
In 1905, the Supreme Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts
upheld a compulsory vaccination order in response to an outbreak of
smallpox. 6' The case involved a well-known vaccine that had proven
effective in treating a small pox threat. 62 In his opinion, Justice
Harlan delivered a strong endorsement of the measure to promote
public health.63 Harlan noted that the only liberty an individual has is

59 Id.
60

Ctr. for Law & the Public's Health, Turning Point Act State Legislative

Update
Table,
(Jan.
1,
2006),
http://www.publichealthlaw.net'
Resources/ResourcesPDFs/MSPHA%20LegisTrack.pdf
("From
January
1,
2003-January 1, 2006, the subject matter or specific language from the Turning
Point Act has been featured or introduced in whole or part through ninety (90) bills
or resolutions in thirty-two (32) states. The extent to which the Act's provisions are
featured in these bills varies extensively.") Since its completion on December 21,
2001, the Center has been tracking state legislative activity related to MSEHPA.
Ctr. for Law & the Public's Health, MSEHPA State Legislative Activity Table,
(Feb.
1,
2006),
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPAMSEHPA
%20Leg%2OActivity.pdf. As of February 1, 2006, the Act has been introduced in
whole or part through bills or resolutions in forty-four states and the District of
Columbia." Id.
61 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-27 (1905).
62

Id.

63

Id. at 27.
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that "regulated by law. ' 64 He added that protection against an
epidemic disease is part of the common good and it is "of paramount
necessity." 65 While the opinion did not address the legality of
mandatory vaccinations using a relatively untested vaccine, it is
precedent for the permissibility of government-enforced vaccinations.
Although the inherent legality of imposing mandatory
medical treatment has been established for nearly 100 years, little
consistency exists in the law for implementing such measures. At the
state level, the authorization of mandatory vaccination in times of
health emergency varies. For example, in Hawaii and Arizona
governors have the power to initiate mandatory vaccination programs
during a public health emergency. 66 However, in Wisconsin an
individual may refuse a vaccination for medical or religious
reasons. 67 Under the MSEHPA, the powers a governor would wield
in a public health emergency, such as an Avian Flu outbreak, would
not include the ability to force an individual to be vaccinated. 68 In
addition, while a Public Health Agency ("PHA") would generally be
empowered to use every available means for stopping the spread of
the virus, patients could not be forced to receive medical treatment or
undergo examination. 69 However, individuals refusing to accept such
care could be subject to isolation or quarantine.7 °
In contrast, the Turning Point Act does allow the PHA to
institute mandatory medical treatment and testing. 71 An individual
that has been exposed to a contagious disease and poses a significant
health risk to the public can be required to complete an appropriate

64 Id.
65 id.
66

Angie A. Welborn, CRS Report for Congress: Mandatory Vaccinations:

Precedent and Current Laws, (Jan. 18, 2005) 3, available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/RS21414.pdf.
67 Id. at 4.
68

MSEHPA § 603 (Ctr. for Law & the Public's Health 2001).

69

Id. §§ 601-603.

'0 Id. §§ 602-603.
7' TURNING POINT ACT § § 5-106(c), 107(b) (Pub. Health Statute Modernization
Nat'l Excellence Collaborative 2003). The Center for Law & the Public's Health at
Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities has merged the MSEHPA into the
Turning Point Act, which now addresses a broad range of emergency and nonemergency public health issues. Choo, supra note 1, at 39.
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course of treatment. 72 However, any health care provider who
examines or treats such individual is required to inform them73 about
the reason for the treatment and measures to avoid reinfection.
In addition, the Turning Point Act empowers the PHA to
require the vaccination of any individual to prevent spread of an
infectious disease.74 In administering the vaccination, the PHA must
comply with four requirements: informed consent must be obtained,
the vaccine must be approved and federally licensed, the treatment
must be justified, and pre-vaccination information must be
provided.75 Individuals who refuse to comply with vaccination are
subject to court order and a criminal action.
However, the Turning Point Act delineates four narrow
exceptions under which an individual may refuse vaccination: 77 (1) if

the individual has a prior existing medical condition that could lead
to a detrimental reaction to the vaccine, (2) if the individual is already
exhibiting symptoms of the disease, (3) if laboratory testing confirms
an existing immunity to the disease, or (4) a signed objection based
on sincere religious beliefs.78
In contrast, there are no federal regulations pertaining to
79
mandatory vaccination programs during a public health emergency.
Under the Public Health Service Act, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services has the authority to make and enforce regulations
necessary to stopping the spread or transmission of communicable80
diseases from foreign countries and from one state to another.
While this would appear to grant broad authority to the federal
government in preventing the spread of communicable disease, it
only authorizes regulations related to the detention apprehension,
examination, and conditional release of individuals.81 Any proposed
federal regulation pertaining to mandatory vaccination would likely
72

TURNING POINT ACT

71

Id. § 5-107(a).

74

Id. § 5-109(a).

71

Id. § 5-109(b).

76

Id. § 5-101(c).

77

TURNING POINT ACT

§ 5-107(b).

§ 5-109(h).

78 Id.

79

Welborn, supra note 66, at 5.

80 id.
81 id.
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require jurisdictional limitations. 82 This reflects a generally accepted
policy that protecting the public health
is primarily the responsibility
83
of the state and local governments.
C. Quarantines
Quarantines can be a powerful and essential tool in curbing
the spread of virus or disease. While most agree that they are an
essential aspect of a competent pandemic preparation procedure,
quarantines also raise several concerns. Issues pertaining to personal
liberty, due process, and privacy are chief among these. 84 However,
like the other emergency health legislation, there is a lack of
consistency throughout jurisdictions. In 2004, a University of
Pittsburgh study identified nineteen "disconnects" among federal,
state, and local public officials on the proper sequence of carrying out
actions, such as declaring a state of emergency and imposing
quarantine zones. 85 Recently, federal officials have taken steps to
modernize existing quarantine laws to ensure readiness for a global
pandemic or bio-terrorist attack.
In April of 2005, President Bush issued an amendment to
Executive Order 13295 Relating to Certain Influenza Viruses and
Quarantinable Communicable Diseases.8 6 The amendment added,
"reemergent influenza viruses that are causing, or have the potential
to cause, a pandemic" to the list of emergencies for which the federal
government is authorized
to detain individuals under the Public
87
Health Service Act.
In addition, on November 30, 2005, the CDC issued a new
proposed rule pertaining to federal quarantine regulations. 88 The
proposal significantly expands the federal government's quarantine
power by vastly broadening the definition of "ill person" to include
those experiencing symptoms commonly associated with a

82 Id.

83 Id.
84

Welborn, supranote 66, at 5.

85

Choo, supra note 1 at 39.

86

Exec. Order No. 13,375, 70 Fed. Reg. 17,299 (Apr. 1, 2005).

87

Id.

70 Fed. Reg. 71,892-71, 948 (Nov. 30, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
70 & 71). These proposed rules would update the Public Health Service Act §§
361-368. Id.
88
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quarantinable disease. 89 This change would greatly expand the
discretion of federal quarantine station directors. u However, the new
proposal has raised some concerns, as it fails to set forth specific
criteria under which an individual may be detained. 91 Finally, the
proposal does not set forth any requirements for maintaining safe
living conditions or providing acceptable levels of medical care for
those individuals under quarantine. 92 These ambiguities make
assurances that detained individuals receive proper care and treatment
much more difficult in times of medical crisis.
However, the proposed CDC rules are not the only federal
legislation pertaining to quarantines. Although the Project Bioshield
II's primary focus concerns encouraging production of vaccines, it
would also increase the severity of penalties for violating federal
quarantines. 93 Specifically, the Act would make the penalty for
violating quarantine
rules and regulations $250,000 and up to ten
94
prison.
in
years
It should be noted that federal regulations authorizing the
apprehension, detention, examination, or conditional release of
individuals is generally limited to individuals entering into a state and
does not extend to individuals residing in a state. 95 This is a
jurisdictional limitation, and reinforces the primary role of the state
and local governments in protecting the public health of its
residents. 96
At the state level both the MSEHPA and Turning Point Act
provide for the quarantine of individuals that have come in contact
with a contagious or possibly contagious disease. 97 However, the
89 Lawrence 0. Gostin, Benjamin E. Berkman, David P. Fidler, Comments
on
Department of Health & Human Services, Control of Communicable Diseases, 2

(Nov. 30, 2005), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/
ResourcesPDFs/Center%20-%20CDC%20QRegs.pdf.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 2-3.
92 Id. at 3.
9' Project Bioshield II Act of 2005, S.975 §2503(a)(l)-(2).

94 Id. This is considerably higher than the existing penalty of $1,000 and up to
one year in prison. Id.
95 Welborn, supra note 66, at 5.
96 Id.

9' MSEHPA § 604(a) (Ctr. for Law & the Public's Health 2001); TURNING

PONT ACT § 5-108(a) (Pub. Health Statute Modernization Nat'l Excellence
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state acts provide for more civil liberty safeguards than the proposed
federal legislation on quarantines. 98 Both Acts require compliance
with eight conditions and principles to ensure that officials are held
accountable for depriving 99
individuals of their liberty and providing
adequate standards of care.
Specifically, the PHA must adhere to the following
conditions: (1) Isolation and quarantine must be by the least
restrictive means necessary. (2) Isolated individuals must be confined
separately from quarantined individuals. (3) The health status of
quarantined and isolated individuals must be monitored regularly to
determine if further containment is necessary. (4) A quarantined
individual who becomes infected must immediately be moved to
isolation. (5) Containment must be terminated immediately when an
individual no longer poses a health threat. (6) The needs of
individuals must be addressed in a systematic and competent fashion,
including providing adequate food, clothing, and shelter. (7) Outside
premises shall be maintained in a safe and hygienic manner; and (8)
to the extent possible cultural and religious beliefs shall be respected
in addressing the needs of individuals. 00 These provisions offer
individuals subject to quarantine and isolation a clearer set of rights
and help to mitigate the possibility of abuse or neglect.
D. Equal Availability for Medical Care
Another critical area of crisis health care management
pertains to the equal distribution of vaccines and medicine in times of
shortage. Without question, an Avian pandemic will intensify the
divisions between the world's wealthest and poorest nations.' While
wealthier nations would have access to limited supplies of vaccines
and antiviral drugs, the poorer countries would endure much higher
° 2 However, this
fatality
due to
of medical
treatments.'
division rates,
will likely
be lack
tangible
domestically
as well. An
outbreak of

Collaborative 2003).
98 MSEHPA § 604(b); TURNING POINT ACT

§ 5-108(b).

§ 604(b); TURNING POINT ACT § 5-108(b).
MSEHPA § 604(b); TURNING POINT ACT § 5-108(b).

99 MSEHPA
100

101Thomas Abraham, Preparingfor a New Global Threat-PartII, When the
Next Wave of Influenza Hits, the World's Poor will Stand to Lose the Most,
YALEGLOBAL,
(Jan. 28, 2005), available at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/
display.article?id=5191.
102 Id.
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the Avian Flu would create an environment ripe for abuse, as more
affluent individuals vie for precious medical care supplies.
Recognizing this threat, lawmakers have incorporated
language that would require surveillance over medical care
management to ensure that classes of underprivileged citizens are not
deprived equal treatment.1 0 3 The Pandemic Preparedness & Response
Act proposed in both the House and Senate, directly addresses this
issue. Under the bill, the National Director of Pandemic Preparedness
and Response would be required to ensure that there is "a specific
focus on traditionally underserved populations, including lowincome, racial and ethnic minorities, immigrants, and uninsured
populations."' 0 4 However, while the bill recognizes the potential for
abuse, it does not list any specific remedies that must be implemented
to ensure equal treatment.
In contrast, while the MSEHPA and the Turning Point Act
provide for the control of health care supplies in times of shortage,
neither makes any specific mention of overseeing delivery to
traditionally underserved populations. 0 5 Instead, the Model Acts give
the PHA the authority to regulate, control, and restrict the use, sale,
dispensing, and transportation of any medical product relevant to
0 6 This includes products not directly
protecting the public welfare.'
07
purchased by the PHA.1
The Model Acts also prevent one state government from
hoarding drugs at the expense of another state where an outbreak has
occurred. 18 In addition, preference may be given to health care
providers, first responders, and mortuary staff.10 9 While these
rationing provisions address key problems of resource management,
they do not address the possibility of poorer Americans having little
or no access to medical supplies.

103

See Pandemic Preparedness & Response Act, S. 1821, 109th Cong. §

2142(b)(15) (2005).
104 Id. The Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plan shall include a specific
focus on surveillance, prevention, and medical care for traditionally underserved
populations, including low-income, racial and ethnic minority, immigrant, and
uninsured populations. Id. § 2144(b)(2)(B).
'0'MSEHPA § 505(b); TURNING POINT ACT § 6-103(e)(2).
106 MSEHPA § 505(b); TURNING POINT ACT § 6-103(e)(2).
107

MSEHPA § 505(b);

TURNING POINT ACT

§ 6-103(e)(2).

108

MSEHPA § 505(d);

TURNING POINT ACT

§ 6-103(e)(3).

§ 505(c);

TURNING POINT ACT

§ 6-103(e)(2).

'09 MSEHPA
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One difficulty in ensuring that all classes will receive equal
access to care is the differences at the state and local levels of the
public and private sector capacity to administer care in a state of
emergency. It is generally assumed, that at a minimum, the state or
local government will take responsibility for immunizing not only
first responders and health workers, but the poor and uninsured as
well. 1 This means that state and local governments must customize
their resource allocations in each jurisdiction based on the mix of
public and private sector capabilities that currently exist, as well as
the anticipated demand of the poor and uninsured during a
pandemic.
Since the demand for public resources will be specific to
individual localities, it will be nearly impossible for a national agency
to oversee the adequate distribution of healthcare to traditionally
neglected groups. This puts the efforts of the states at the forefront of
ensuring that plans and procedures are in place to adequately address
the demand on public resources in the event of a pandemic.
An additional aspect of availability addressed by lawmakers is
the prospect of consumers getting charged exorbitantly high prices in
the midst of a pandemic. Under the Pandemic Preparedness and
Response Act, it would be unlawful for any person to sell a drug for
the prevention or treatment of influenza at a price that is
unconscionably excessive or indicates the seller is taking unfair
advantage of the circumstances to increase prices unreasonably. 113
However, the Act does not specify any sanctions that may be
imposed for such violations.
The MSEHPA also addresses this concern by granting public
health officials property control measures over certain commercial

110 Ill. Dept. of Pub. Health, Pandemic Influenza Preparednessand Response
Plan, 74
(Oct.
2005),
available at http://www.idph.state.il.us/flu/

Pandemic%20Main%20Planfina10302revised0 105.pdf.
111 Id.
112 Id.

Pandemic Preparedness and Response Act, S. 1821, 109th Cong. §
4(i)(1)(A) (2005). In making this determination a court shall take into account
whether the amount charged represents a gross disparity between the price of the
drug for the prevention or treatment of influenza and the price at which the drug
was offered for sale in the usual course of the seller's business immediately prior to
the public health emergency; or whether the amount charged grossly exceeds the
price at which the same or similar drug, was readily obtainable by other purchasers
in the area in which the declaration applies. Id. § 4 (i)(1)(B).
113
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transactions and practices such as price gouging."14 Under the
MSEHPA, officials are allowed to regulate the distribution of scarce
health care supplies and control the price of critical items during an
emergency. 115
E. Legal Remedies for Injury
A key aspect of nearly all pandemic legislation is providing
incentives to drug manufacturers and healthcare administrators to
ensure that the proper resources and infrastructure are available when
necessary. A central component of this effort is providing protection
from liability for injuries sustained during the administration of
vaccines or other medical care. 1 6 While this protection is often a
necessary condition of spurring innovation, it must be accompanied
by a fair and equitable compensation regime for potential injured
parties. Since the primary goal of liability protections is to spur drug
manufacturers all over the world to provide vaccines and medical
treatments on a national scale, this aspect of pandemic preparedness
is restricted to federal initiatives.
Concerns over vaccine manufacturer liability first surfaced
when insurers would no longer cover vaccine manufacturers.'17 Their
refusal can be attributed in large part from the case of Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories,in which polio vaccine manufacturers were held strictly
liable for failing to provide product warnings to individuals that had
been vaccinated. 18 The prospect of a large number of strict liability
suits led insurers to stop offering that kind of insurance to vaccine
manufacturers. "19
The federal government's vaccine liability and compensation
program began with the National Swine Flu Immunization Program
James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Model State Emergency
Health Powers Act - A Brief Commentary (Jan. 2002), 19, available at
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/Center%/o20MSEHPA%2OCommentary.
pdf
114

115 Id.

Michael Greenberger, The 800 Pound Gorilla Sleeps: The Federal
Government's Lackadaisical Liability and Compensation Policies in the Context
Pre-Event Vaccine Immunization Programs, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 7, 36
116

(2005).
"' Id. at
118 Id.
119

Id.
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of 1976.120 The Act authorized the establishment and implementation
of an emergency Swine Flu immunization program and provided an
exclusive remedy for personal injury or death arising out of the
manufacture, distribution, or administration of the Swine Flu
vaccine. 11 Under the Act, injured plaintiffs asserted claims directly
against the United States through the Federal Tort Claims Act,
instead of against the party that committed the actual wrong.' 22 The
United States thereby assumed the liability of manufacturers,
distributors, and vaccinators under a system that made the
government liable to all plaintiffs that could demonstrate an injury
caused by the swine flu vaccine. 123 Although claimants first had to
file an administrative claim with the agency before proceeding to
federal district court, there
were no limits on the amount of award
24

that could be obtained.1

In 2004, Congress passed the Project Bioshield Act,
immunizing manufacturers from liability for harm caused by certain
vaccines and other agents by designating them as federal employees
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.125 Project Bioshield applies to
research and development of qualified countermeasures pertaining to
chemical, radiological, or nuclear agents that may be used in a
terrorist attack. 126 Like the Swine Flu Act, the Project Bioshield Act
did not establish a no-fault compensation system but allows personal
27
injury claims to be brought directly against the federal government. 1
Under the proposed Bioshield II Act, additional measures
would be implemented to spur new drug innovation further. Bioshield
II would specifically cover countermeasures "designed, developed,
modified, used, or procured for the purpose of preventing, detecting,
identifying, or treating pandemic influenza or limiting the harm such
120 Id.
121

Nat'l Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 247(b)

(2004).
122

Greenberger, supra note 116, at 12.

123 Id.

124

Id. at 13. Compare this to the approach taken under the National Childhood

Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 where the government established a two-staged, no
fault compensation system for specific childhood vaccines. Public Health Service
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-25 (1987).
125 Project Bioshield Act of 2004, 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6a (2004).
126

Id.

127 Id.
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influenza might otherwise cause."' 28 Under the proposed bill, an
individual's right to pursue a civil action for injuries sustained would
still exist. However, this right would be limited by a number of
liability restrictions.
Specifically, in claims involving healthcare volunteers and
hospitals there would be an exclusive Federal cause of action if the
governor of that State declared a state of emergency, or the Secretary
of Health and Human Services declared that a public health
emergency was in effect in that State, or the President signed a
disaster declaration for that State. 129 This action could only be
brought in the United States district court for the District of Columbia
and recovery would only be allowed for injuries that were caused by
willful or wanton misconduct.' 30 In addition, injured consumers are
for punitive damages or non-economic damages
not able to recover
3'
Act.'
the
under
The Bioshield II Act would also place limits on the amount of
recovery that an injured consumer would be able to receive under
such circumstances. In instances in which a hospital is providing care
under emergency conditions and such care is not administered for or
in expectation of compensation, then the maximum liability to the
Federal Government on behalf of the hospital, or its employees,
volunteers, officers, and directors, is $250,000 for each claimant.
The Biodefense Act has proposed even more extreme
limitations on consumer recovery. Under the Act, a consumer must
petition the Secretary to investigate any allegations relating to
injuries prior to filing suit against a "manufacturer, distributor or
administrator of a security countermeasure or a qualified pandemic
and epidemic product ... or a health care provider." 33 The decision
to commence an investigation "shall be within the Secretary's
discretion and shall not be subject to judicial review."'1 34 In making
this determination, the Secretary must find clear and convincing
128

Project Bioshield II Act, S. 975, 109th Cong. § 341(a)(6)(A)(ii)(II)(bb)

(2005).
129

Id. §

319F-10(a)(1).

130 id.

3' Id. § 319F-10(b)(2)-(3).
132

Id. § 319F-10(b)(1).

Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine and Drug Development Act of 2005, S.
1873, 109th Cong. § 319F-3(a) & (b)(1)(C)(ii) (2005).
133

14

Id. § 319F-(b)(1)(C)(ii).
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evidence that the manufacturer, distributor, administrator, or health
care provider (1) "violated a provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act" or the Biodefense Act, (2) that they acted with willful
misconduct, 135 (3) that such misconduct "caused the product to
present a significant or unreasonable risk to human health",
36 and (4)
party."'
the
by
alleged
injury
the
caused
proximately
it
"that
The framework for recovery under the Biodefense Act places
far too high a burden on injured consumers. While manufacturers,
distributors, administrators, and health care providers have the ability
to seek judicial review of the Secretary's determination, consumers
do not.1 7 This disparity in rights is unwarranted and fails to consider
the harsh impact on health care consumers.

III. Recommendations
As lawmakers continue updating existing medical emergency
legislation in light of the recent Avian Flu threat, it is imperative that
they coordinate their efforts at the state and federal levels to
minimize the impacts on consumers. While it is the primary
responsibility of state and local governments to manage the public
health of its citizens, the support of a cooperative federal government
is indispensable. Therefore, it is essential that lawmakers examine the
strengths and weaknesses of legislation at both levels to ensure an
effective and synchronized pandemic response.
One major obstacle to ensuring an organized and effective
response to an Avian pandemic is the lack of uniformity in existing
legislation among jurisdictions. This lack of uniformity has a
detrimental effect on the ability to implement a coordinated effort, as
well as maintaining the trust and understanding of citizens. Without
knowledge about emergency procedures, government reliance on the
voluntary cooperation of potential patients will be futile.
A major component of building an informed population of
health care consumers needs to be directed at ensuring that
individuals are aware of the consequences of the decisions that they
make.' 3 8 This includes not only an understanding of the personal

...Id. § 319F-(b)(1)(D)(i)(I)-(II).
'36 Id. § 319F-(b)(1)(D)(ii)(I)-(II).
131 Id. § 319F-(b)(1)(D)(v).

Wendy E. Parmet, Informed Consent and Public Health: Are They
Compatible When it Comes to Vaccines?, J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y, 70, 110
(2005).
138
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risks associated with medical decisions, but the repercussions that
these decisions have on the public welfare as well.139 Decisions such
as whether or not to be vaccinated or follow recommended preventive
measures such as wearing a facemask, are all crucial to this
process. 40 Each of these personal decisions affects the community at
large, especially the sick and vulnerable, by altering the number of
potential carriers of disease. 14 1 If properly informed, individuals will
be better equipped to comprehend the public costs of their actions
and develop the habit 42of taking the health of others into account when
an emergency arises.1
Moreover, if the government wants individuals to comply
with directives pertaining to vaccinations and quarantines, it would
be wise to provide them with the reasons to do so before an
emergency Occurs. 14 3 Informed consent about routine vaccinations,
including flu vaccines, may provide a unique opportunity for this
assignment. 44 Information provided about vaccines can begin the
process of reminding people of the public impact of their health care
decisions and the public benefits of vaccines.l:45 The state government
is uniquely situated to handle this task, as it is the body that oversees
these routine health care procedures.
A second issue that legislators must address is setting
adequate standards for implementing and enforcing quarantines and
isolations.146 As noted, these tools are an integral component of
ensuring that the spread of the Avian Flu is contained in the midst of
a pandemic. However, these countermeasures also create an immense
opportunity for abuse. Any deprivation of liberty on the part of
government must be accompanied by rigorous standards for
evaluating the circumstances under which an individual may be held,
as well as the environment in which they may be kept.
In this regard, the MSEHPA and the Turning Point Act more
astutely balance the necessities and dangers of quarantines and

139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.

143

Parmet, supra note 138, at 110.

144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
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isolations than the proposed federal legislation. 147 Under the federal
approach, the CDC's proposed rules significantly expand the scope of
federal power pertaining to quarantines. 148 Specifically, the federal
rules encompass a wide array of symptoms for which an individual
may be quarantined. 149 This affords directors of federal quarantine
stations unfettered discretion. 150 In addition, the CDC's rules do not
provide for specific standards of shelter or medical care during

detainment. 151

In contrast, under the MSEHPA and Turning Point Act
quarantine and isolation powers are more restrained. Such powers are
only exercised so long as is reasonably necessary, and only among
people who pose a risk to others. 152 Also, individuals retain the right
to contest a quarantine order within 48 hours unless there are
extraordinary circumstances, giving due regard to the public's health
and the rights of the affected individuals. 153 Finally, both Acts spell
out specific procedures that must be followed during quarantine and
isolation to preserve an adequate level of medical care. 154 This
greater specificity will provide more guidance to consumers as to
their rights in a medical emergency, as well as a higher level of
government restraint.
While federal and state quarantine efforts will operate
independently of one another due to jurisdictional limitations, the
importance of cooperation and uniformity cannot be overstated. In
this regard, federal lawmakers should consider implementing
quarantine regulations that resemble the Model Acts in specifying the
rights and care afforded to detainees in times of medical emergency.
Although lawmakers have proposed legislation protecting
consumers against price gouging for medicines and vaccines during
an influenza pandemic, there has been little concern given to ensuring
MSEHPA § 604(b) (Ctr. for Law & the Public's Health 2001); TURNING
§ 5-108(b) (Pub. Health Statute Modernization Nat'l Excellence
Collaborative 2003). See supra Part II.C.
147

POINT ACT
148

Gostin, supra note 89, at 2.

149 id.
150

Id.

151Id. at 3.
152

MSEHPA § 604(b);

TURNING POINT ACT

Gostin, supra note 114, at 9-10.
153 MSEHPA, § 604(b); TURNING
154

MSEHPA, § 604(b);

POINT ACT

TURNING POINT ACT

§ 5-108(b); see also Hodge &

§ 5-108(f).
§ 5-108(b)(6)-(7).
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that there are adequate resources available to treat the poor and
uninsured. At the federal level, the Pandemic Preparedness &
Response Act proposed by Congress does acknowledge the existence
of this problem, however; it does not give any specificity as to the
efforts to avoid inequitable treatment.
At the state and local level more needs to be done to ensure
that large and concentrated densities of underprivileged groups are
not left with inadequate resources for medical treatment. State and
local governments must develop forecasts regarding the type of
demand that they would have to satisfy given their specific
socioeconomic attributes. This will aid efforts to distribute medical
care according to need and not politics.
Finally, Congress must continue to be generous with its
vaccine liability and compensation structure. Pharmaceutical
companies will undoubtedly be hesitant to engage in research and
development of vaccines unless they are afforded stringent liability
protections. This will support other government efforts to stimulate
development of crucial countermeasures against fatal viruses such as
Avian Flu.
However, these measures should be balanced with a fair and
adequate compensation structure for potentially harmed consumers of
these medicines and vaccines. This should include a quick and welldefined compensation regime that will allow injured victims a
determinable amount of compensation in the event that unknown
complications materialize. Consumers must also be afforded a cause
of action against the federal government if they find this
compensation regime to be inadequate. An effective compensation
and liability program will drastically increase the participation of
both drug manufacturers and consumers in preparing for an influenza
pandemic.
While these recommendations do not nearly encompass all the
potential impacts on consumers, they serve as a starting point for
legislators in drafting and ratifying pandemic legislation. They
account for a large portion of the reservations that health care
consumers have about the government response to an influenza
outbreak. As such, the government can go a long way in bolstering
the trust and cooperation of its citizens by ensuring that they are
protected against and aware of the risks and responses during a global
pandemic.

Pandemic Preparedness and Response Act, S. 1821, 109th Cong. §
4(i)(1)(A) (2005).
155
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IV. Conclusion
In order to ensure a high level of readiness, state and federal
lawmakers must work together to guarantee that pandemic
preparedness regulations and procedures complement each other.
Although the approaches currently taken by each level of government
differ, they are not entirely incompatible. As noted, it is primarily the
role of the state and local authorities to ensure the public health. This
means the role of the federal government should be mainly directed
toward facilitating the states' efforts, as well as bolstering national
production and supply of vaccines and crucial medical supplies.
While both levels of government need to continue to improve their
coordination efforts, the national recognition of an Avian Flu threat
has forced lawmakers at all levels into action and resulted in a great
deal of legislative progress. However, these initiatives must be
accompanied by a corresponding effort to increase the awareness of
health care consumers as to their rights and obligations in times of
medical emergency.

